Updated 1 December, 2003
From Shortage to Longage: Forty Years in the Population Vineyards
Originally published in Festschrift in Honor of Dr. Garrett Hardin
Population and Environment: A Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies Volume
12, Number 3, Spring 1991
Copyright 1991 Human Sciences Press, Inc.
For copyright permission, click here.
Covariation is a treacherous indicator of causation. When the first
Earth Day was celebrated in 1970 there was much talk of population size
as an element in the production of pollution and environmental degradation.
Unquestionably Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb, published two years
earlier, was largely responsible for the sudden surge in public perception.
In the ensuing twenty years world population increased by 1,600 million
people--some 43%-while the American population increased by 50 million,
or 25%. Was there, in the celebrations of Earth Week 1990, a corresponding
increase in the emphasis on population? Quite the contrary: Population
was scarcely mentioned. Should we then conclude that the larger a population
grows the less important population size is?
Biologists take the opposite view. Impacts of a population on the environment
are of two sorts: the reduction of wanted resources and the addition of
unwanted wastes. Both kinds of impacts are proportional to population
size. The per capita impact of population can be lessened somewhat by
changes in technology and life-styles, but the asymptote of the per capita
impact curve is well above zero. The fundamental equation connecting the
variables can be expressed in simple words:
Total impact = (per capita impact) x (population size)
In 1798 Malthus thought that the principal impact of population growth
was to be found in the creation of a scarcity of food. Unfortunately for
his reputation, the progress of science and technology in the nearly two
centuries since his celebrated essay was published has actually resulted
in an increase in the per capita production of food worldwide. This does
not mean that starvation has disappeared: distribution is (and has always
been) imperfect.
During the same period, however, the per capita production of pollutants
has also increased, as has the degradation of many of the environmental
amenities, e.g., uncrowded beaches and pristine wilderness. In his posthumous
book, A Sand County Almanac, Aldo Leopold remarked that "One of the
penalties of an ecological education is that one lives alone in a world
of wounds." Thirteen years later Rachel Carson, in Silent Spring,
brought ecological education to Mary R. and John Q. Citizen. Now we all
live in a world of wounds. (This is an improvement over ecological ignorance.)
Although definite progress has been made in mitigating some of the adverse
effects of population-powered industrialism, new insults to the environment
have been uncovered since Leopold and Carson, e.g., acid rain and greenhouse
gases. The magnitude of these environmental insults is clearly proportional
to the size of the human population (and to other factors too, of course).
The cost of mitigation necessarily rises faster than population size,
but that does not deter a few compulsively cheerful defenders of pre-ecological
economics from asserting that we have nothing to worry about because the
human brain is "the ultimate resource," its power being (it
is asserted) quite unlimited. We are grateful to Keith Caldwell for the
last word in this matter: "Whom the gods would destroy they first
make optimists."
Demographers-the specialists officially in charge of population studies-are
neither optimists nor pessimists. They see their task as one of counting
everything human. Nondemographers sometimes wonder how many of their data
will ever see important use. Examine, if you will, any issue of the Demographic
Yearbook published by the United Nations: what fraction of the millions
of figures recorded therein will ever be of any use to anyone? Surely
the fraction must be small, principally because the probable error of
the figures is never given because it is unknown. We are lucky if the
official population figure for the world is accurate to within 5%that
means an uncertainty of plus or minus 265 million! (Such an error is greater
than the total U.S. population.)
Or look at the output of the World Fertility Survey, which was carried
out during the 1980s. Women's expressed intentions in the matter of family
formation were determined by the polling of many nations. The cost of
this effort was in excess of $50 million. No doubt the carrying out of
this survey reduced unemployment among the young academics who did the
work, but no one has been able to point to any substantial intellectual
product flowing from all the effort. So why was such a survey carried
out?
The discipline of psychiatry offers us a useful insight. Psychoanalysis
depends on the free flow of talk from the patient, but analysts are acutely
aware that the flow sometimes becomes a flood. When a patient compulsively
and repeatedly verbalizes the anxieties of his daily life the analyst
concludes that he suffers from logorrhea-diarrhea of the larynx, to translate
freely from the Greek. It is the deluge of words (logos), rather than
the words themselves, that is psychologically significant. The psychiatrist
asks himself, "What is the patient trying not to say? Why does he
work so hard to avoid meaningful communication?"
At the present time there is much talk about the importance of bringing
more "numeracy" into public education. The goal is indeed a
good one; but just as words can be multiplied beyond benefit so also can
numbers be gathered and processed too zealously. The pathology of rhetoric
we call logorrhea; the pathology of numeracy produces a statistical diarrhea
that we can call arithmorrhea.
In the physical sciences theory is built on fundamental data that are
constant. The resultant web of theory permits confident predictions of
the consequences of altering parameters in the system. By contrast, the
data of the behavioral sciences are not constant, and they are poorly
integrated into theory. Encouraged perhaps by successes in the physical
sciences, demographers have accorded too much confidence to past historical
trends, often with ludicrous results. In 1946 demographers at the U.S.
Bureau of the Census, scanning the trend of the past few decades, predicted
that the population of the United States in the year 1990 would be 165
million. The year 1990 has now arrived and the population is 54% greater
than predicted. Rene Dubos was quite right when he said, "Trend is
not destiny." Lacking the ability to turn their data into reliable
signposts of the future, demographers gather a great many data that are
sadly dispensable.
The public has been so well indoctrinated with the ideals of the natural
sciences that it supposes that any numbers that can be gathered may be
useful some time, some place. Only a few voices questioned whether it
was really worth the expenditure of $2.3 billion to carry out the 1990
census of the United States. (It is not generally known that the Netherlands
has not taken a census since 1973, nor has the government any present
intention of taking another. We note that Holland is not exactly what
one would call a backward country. Maybe the Dutch know something we do
not.)
APPROACHING THE LIMITS OF POPULATION
At least for the immediate future I think the greatest progress in the
study of population will be made not by gathering more statistics but
by discovering and making clear a few fundamental concepts. The impact
equation given earlier is one such fundamental. This in turn rests on
the idea of carrying capacity, the limit to the number of animals a given
territory can safely support for an indefinite period of time, without
damage to the environment. Unless the limitedness of carrying capacity
is admitted there is little point in counting the number of living bodies.
When we come to the human species the concept of carrying capacity must
be enlarged to that of the cultural carrying capacity. Human beings are
not content to live at the lowest possible level of resource exploitation,
though that would maximize the size of the human population. Instead,
we prefer to use resources with some extravagance-to introduce light,
heat and cooling into our buildings; to manufacture fashionable clothing
that does more than merely shield the body from intemperate weather; to
build and use automobiles, airplanes, sailing vessels; to finance vacations;
to write, print and stockpile books; and so on. The greater the extravagance
the higher the material standard of living - the lower must be the cultural
carrying capacity of the environment. What standard of material comfort
we should regard as proper is a matter for continuing debate.
Every standard implies limits. Thanks to science and technology, material
limits have moved upward during the past two centuries. Not surprisingly,
this progress has led many scientifically illiterate people to deny the
existence of limits entirely. During the 1980s compulsive optimists seized
the reins of political and media power, thus contributing to the suppression
of the discussion of population during the Earth Week celebrations of
1990. By this time population was, in some quarters, almost a tabooed
subject.
TABOOS AND THE CHOICE OF WORDS
Taboo begins its reign of repression with the choice of words. Consider
the word "shortage." If a community requires 100 units of energy
to live for one year (at a specified standard of living), but is able
to secure only 99, it is automatically said that "there is a shortage
of energy." Instead of speaking of a shortage of supply we could
just as truly say that there is a longage of demand. As we seek solutions
to practical problems why do we never use the word "longage"?
To begin with, the word "longage" is not in any dictionary
(though I was so tactless as to coin it in 1975). On the other hand, according
to the Oxford English Dictionary, "shortage" has been in use
since 1868. Though every shortage of supply is equally a longage of demand,
commercial agents always focus on shortages. Curing shortages produces
profits. Manufacturers, transporters and merchandisers all stand to gain
by increasing supplies. Longages are another story. If, in our minds,
we translate a shortage of energy into a longage of people-or a longage
of demand per person-we then discover that it is not easy to find competent
enterprising agents who stand to gain by reducing a longage. For many
centuries philosophers, clergymen, and idealists of many sorts have harangued
humanity about the importance of reducing demands, curbing extravagance,
and living a simpler life; but no Fortune-400 business has been built
on reducing demand. So why mention longage at all if there is no profit
in it?
When we come to population matters there are good reasons for at least
considering the possibility of reducing demand. When population growth
is involved we face this paradoxical truth: You can't cure a shortage
by increasing the supply. Given the exponential nature of population growth,
once the repressive effect of a felt shortage is removed, the multiplication
of demanders soon nullifies any increase in supply. The increased supply
is simply converted into a larger population. At that point the uncomfortable
feeling of a shortage is reestablished, but this time at a higher level
of population.
"So what?" one might ask: "if the feeling is the same,
is the situation made any worse by an increase in population?" Yes,
it is: the explanation follows from what the 19th century chemist Justus
von Liebig called "limiting factors," the discussion of which
can be made somewhat clearer by using the economists' term "production
factors."
WHICH SHALL WE SANCTIFY - LIFE, OR CARRYING CAPACITY?
In the late 1980s, when the rich people of the world were made suddenly
aware of starvation taking place in Ethiopia, a massive attempt was made
to get food to the starving people. Sales from a popular record, "We
Are the World," channeled $4.5 million into the effort. The justification
of this campaign had many prongs: one was the ethical idea of the "sanctity
of life." In practice, this concept led to the assertion that everything
possible should be done to prevent loss of life from starvation. Food
was airlifted into Ethiopia. As happens in all crisis-driven undertakings
much waste ensued, but citing this fact does not constitute a fundamental
criticism because no doubt some lives were saved. So why look askance
at the charitable activity?
An ecological economist views the problems of poor countries in the following
way. In a country like Ethiopia there are three major production factors:
cropland, pasture land, and forest land. Cropland produces human food
directly. Pasture land produces human food indirectly, through the conversion
of (inedible) grass into (edible) meat and milk. The third production
factor, forest land, is land that produces woody plants-bushes as well
as trees-anything that can serve as fuel in the cooking of food.
In an ecologically balanced economy, these three production factors keep
the people well-nourished without the factors themselves being degraded
over time. The people live within the carrying capacity of their environment.
But people starve when the supply of food generated by these production
factors is less than the demand for food created by a too large population.
In a "state of nature," i.e., when there are no inputs of food
from the outside and the people are dependent only on their own productivity,
an excess of population is soon corrected by excess mortality. For thousands
of years local overpopulation was rectified in this way. In those days
of poor communication and slow and expensive transportation there was
really no other option.
Today electronic satellites and television make it possible to see -
instantaneously - people starving to death on the other side of the world;
and modern transportation has greatly increased the speed and lessened
the cost of sending food to the needy. The fashionable saying, "Life
is sacred," is interpreted as meaning that the preservation of the
life of each and every human being is a prime imperative, overriding all
other considerations. Most people regard the saving of the lives of strangers
at a great distance as a morally noble by-product of scientific progress.
But when time is taken into consideration it can be shown that such a
"noble" act is counterproductive of its implicit aim which,
surely, is to minimize the total amount of human suffering over time.
The admirable impulses of the traditional moralist must be confronted
with the ecologist's time-shackled question, "And then what?"
With a few or no exceptions close examination of the economy of nations
that chronically suffer from starvation reveals that the production factors
are already severely over-stressed. In Ethiopia, land that should not
be farmed is farmed, with a resultant loss of soil; too many animals are
kept on the pasture lands, leading to the loss of soil and the replacement
of "sweet grass" by weeds; and bushes and trees are removed
from steep slopes resulting in a loss of soil that ultimately makes the
reestablishment of woody plants impossible. (Internationalists should
note that soil lost from the mountains of Ethiopia becomes silt in Egypt's
Lake Nasser, thus shortening the useful lifetime of the High Aswam Dam.)
When a country is overpopulated-when its population is greater than the
carrying capacity of its land, whatever standard of living is used in
reaching a judgementsaving lives today by direct gifts of food ensures
that more lives will be lost tomorrow because of the increased environmental
destruction made possible by the encouragement of population growth. The
time-blind ideal, "Human life is sacred," is counterproductive.
"'Sacred," like all old words, has many meanings and connotations.
What we are concerned with here is its related meaning of sacrosanct or
inviolable. When disputants say that human life is sacred they clearly
mean that we should preserve every human being now living regardless of
the cost, either now or in the future. Though not given to using emotionally
charged words, an ecologist would be more inclined to say that the environment,
not human beings, is sacrosanct. The moment this proposition is advanced
the conventional moralist expostulates: "Oh! You mean you prefer
the life of dickey-birds to human beings? You prefer redwood trees to
people?"
We have all heard such contemptuous questions. The questioner misses
the point. Ecologists confer sacrosanctity on the carrying capacity of
the environment in order to better the condition of men and women in the
continuing future. When an ecological moralist proposes an Eleventh Commandment,
"Thou shalt not transgress the carrying capacity," he is trying
to improve the quality of life over a long period of time. Redwood trees
and dickey-birds are seen as the symbols of the good life for human beings.
Environmental extremists may talk of an undefined intrinsic value of the
environment, but we need not follow them down this dubious rhetorical
path. When we recommend that Ethiopians refrain from overgrazing their
pastures and overharvesting their woody mountains we need not demand that
they worship the landscape, merely that they take thought of what the
environment will have to offer their descendants. A time-sensitive system
of ethics cannot be blind to environmental values.
ENIGMAS OF POPULATION CONTROL
The potential of exponential growth in the human population is a standing
threat of human welfare. Until very recently, however, this threat was
mitigated by the sporadic eruption of such crowd-diseases as dysentery,
cholera and plague which, at their worst, could wipe out a quarter to
a half of a population in a year or two. Crowd-diseases were the most
important negative feedbacks of the Malthusian demostat.
Sanitation and modern medicine have greatly weakened the power of disease
as an effective controller of population size. When external controls
are eliminated, humanity must then face the problem of devising alternative
controls that are internal to the species. In the past two centuries much
effort has been expended looking for acceptable internal population controls-so
far without much success. This daunting problem remains to be solved.
Early in the twentieth century Margaret Sanger braved ecclesiastical
censure and persuaded the medical profession and the general public that
contraception could serve moral ends. Birth control (later called "family
planning") was seen as the answer to the population problem. Desires
of individual women became entangled with community needs as people carelessly
assumed that Birth Control = Population Control. Unfortunately, the equivalence
is less than total.
The official goal of family planning is to make it possible for a woman
to have the number of children she wants when she wants them. Promoters
of family planning assiduously (and wisely, from a public relations point
of view) avoid the issue of how many children a woman should have, this
being regarded as her private business. So if a woman wants too many children
(too many, from the community's point of view), family planners will help
her get too many.
To keep from growing, a population must maintain equality between its
birth and death rates. Individual fertility can safely vary somewhat so
long as the total number of births equals the total number of deaths,
on the average. Obviously it would be a miracle if the individual desires
of women should automatically produce the proper birth rate from the community's
point of view. Population control is a community need; birth control is
a personal activity. There is no reason why the activity should automatically
match the need. In fact, the equivalence is rarely found. Everywhere in
the world, variable though death rates are, the average number of children
desired is greater than the number needed to balance the death rate. That
is why birth control should not be confused with population control. (Of
course contraception makes population control easier to achieve.)
Despite this elementary fact, government and private foundations are
still investing millions of dollars yearly looking for better methods
of birth control under the aegis of "population research." The
research itself may well be worth doing, but it sails under false colors
because it gives the impression of grappling with a difficult problem
that is in fact being evaded.
One of the most successful evasions has been the pseudo-theory known
as the "demographic transition." Born in France in the 1930s,
it dominated demographic thought for some forty years. In 1975 Michael
Teitelbaum said that "ironically its explanatory power has come into
increasing scientific doubt at the very time it is achieving its greatest
acceptance by nonscientists." We are now into the 1990s and still
the demographic transition dominates popular discussions of population.
So what is this theory that has such power?
Curiously, there is no authoritative and clear exposition of the theory.
The common feature of its several variants is the faith that if we just
let population "have its head" a benign adjustment will necessarily
take place: the birth rate will spontaneously drop to the level of the
death rate and all will be well. So demographic transition theory is just
one more evasion from the necessity of rigorous thinking about the problem
of controlling human population growth.
A more explicitly antiMalthusian theory is what is called the "child
survival hypothesis." This asserts (first) that poor people have
too many children because their awareness of high infant mortality impels
them to produce extra children as a form of insurance; and (second) that
if outside interveners reduce infant mortality, the people's fertility
will be correspondingly reduced also (because the insurance is no longer
needed). Therefore the way to get poor nations to stop overbreeding is
to make them so prosperous that they will spontaneously reduce their infant
mortality to the modern low level. Is this true?
Data vary, and one cannot be sure that what happens in the initial decade
of a program will continue. The most defensible conclusion is that made
by a close study of population growth in Guatemala, namely that if the
postulated response is indeed true, it will appear only a generation or
two after infant mortality has been brought down. A miserably poor population
that is doubling in size in 23 years or less cannot wait a generation
or two for the asserted benefit to appear. Nonetheless, the child survival
hypothesis is very popular because it justifies charitable acts that give
much pleasure to the donors.
LIMITS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE
The recognition of limits leads to a pattern of thinking that is guided
by the perception of longages of demand. After centuries of thinking in
terms of shortages of supply we are apt to find the idea of longages of
demand uncomfortably threatening. By contrast the presumption of shortages
of supply easily leads to seduction by the laissez-faire conjectures of
the demographic transition theory and the child survival hypothesis, both
of which tell us that freedom is the best policy.
Without attempting any overall evaluation of laissez-faire theory we
are now in a position to examine laissez-faire birth control (B.C.) as
a demographic policy. It is easy to show that the value of a complex policy
depends on the total milieu in which it operates. Two important situations
can be distinguished.
(1) Laissez-faire B.C. + NO social welfare- Equilibrium
This is the equilibrium of the pure Malthusian demostatic system, which
holds for animal species in general, and was true during most of historic
time for the human species. Statistically speaking, couples who had too
many children for the environmental resources at their command left fewer
living, breeding descendants than did couples who bred less extravagantly.
Under these conditions one did not have to anticipate a need for the social
control of fertility because the laissez-faire system was self-correcting.
(2) Laissez-faire B.C. + Welfare State --- > Runaway
Growth
When, as shown in equation (2), the state assumes responsibility for
the survival of all children, no matter how imprudently conceived, the
self-correcting capability of the Malthusian demostat is removed. The
population then increases until universal misery takes over as the ultimate
negative feedback. If welfare functions are held to be too precious to
be abandoned, then laissez-faire in birth control must be abandoned. This
is the bullet we hesitate to bite.
The reason for our hesitation is obvious: we don't want to give up any
of our freedoms. We are loath to admit that accepting a benefit always
involves costs of some sort. The benefit is absorbed into a closely-knit
system of social arrangements. One of the most basic of ecological principles
is this: We can never do merely one thing. The known "one thing"
we achieved with the conquest of crowd diseases in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries conferred unquestioned benefits on humanity. Now we
must ask, What compensatory sacrifices must we make if we are to continue
to enjoy those benefits? This, in a nutshell, is the seldom defined "population
question."
Until the present time, arithmorrhea and the elaboration of pleasant
but unsupportable conjectures like the demographic transition theory and
the child survival hypothesis have enabled us to evade thinking rigorously
about population, but time is running out. After nearly two centuries
of evasion will historical events finally force us to face the population
question during the last decade of the twentieth century? I, for one,
am eager to find out!
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